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FUENTES V. SHEVIN: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
AND LOUISIANA CREDITOR'S REMEDIES
John C. Anderson* and Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.**
Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure a defendant
can be dispossessed of his property without prior notice or a
hearing if the plaintiff's allegations in his verified petition meet
the requirements for the issuance of either the writ of sequestration or attachment and if the plaintiff furnishes security.'
Under both writs the defendant remains dispossessed of his
property pending the outcome of the litigation unless he files a
motion to dissolve the writ and, at the contradictory hearing, the
2
plaintiff fails to prove he is entitled to the provisional remedy.
A debtor can also be dispossessed of his property without notice
or a prior hearing when the creditor, relying on the debtor's confession of judgment, proceeds through executory process to have
the property seized and eventually sold unless the debtor pre* Member, Baton Rouge Bar who worked on the paper while a senior at
LSU Law School.
**Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. [Editor's
Note. After the article had been submitted and accepted for publication,
Professor L'Enfant became associated in litigation before the Louisiana
Supreme Court involving the constitutionality of Louisiana's executory process.]
The authors acknowledge with gratitude the research assistance of Mr.
John Weeks, associate editor of the Louisiana Law Review.
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3501 provides: "A writ of attachment or of
sequestration shall issue only when the nature of the claim and the amount
thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ
clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition verified by, or by
the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel or agent.
"The applicant shall furnish security as required by law for the payment of the damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained
wrongfully."
But the writ of sequestration may be obtained in certain cases without
fixing security, e.g., to enforce lessor's privilege, LA. CODE: Crv. P. art. 3575;
to enforce the repairman's privilege, LA. R.S. 9:4501, 4502 (1950).
2. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3506 provides: "The defendant by contradictory
motion may obtain the dissolution of a writ of attachment or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued.
If the writ of attachment or of sequestration is dissolved, the action shall
then proceed as if no writ had been issued.
"The court may allow damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of
attachment or of sequestration on a motion to dissolve, or on a reconventional demand. Attorney's fees for the services rendered in connection with
the dissolution of the writ may be included as an element of damages
whether the writ is dissolved on motion or after trial on the merits."
3. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2631: "Executory proceedings are those which are
used to effect the seizure and sale of property, without previous citation and
judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon evidenced by an
authentic act importing a confession of judgment, and in other cases allowed
by law."
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vents the sale by obtaining an injunction 4 or by taking a suspensive appeal.' The long existence9 and widespread use of these
procedures showed confidence that such remedies did not violate
the fourteenth amendment prohibition against depriving a person of property without due process of law. This confidence was
justified in the light of early United States Supreme Court cases.
In McInnes v. McKay,7 a Maine statute which provided for the
attachment of the defendant's goods pending the outcome of litigation was challenged on the grounds that it deprived the defendant of property without due process of law. In upholding the
constitutionality of the statute the Maine court reasoned that the
attachment was not "deprivation of property" as contemplated
by the Constitution because it was temporary, conditional, and
part of the procedure by which property of a debtor is taken to
satisfy a judgment. And the court further reasoned that even if
it were such a "deprivation" it was not "without due process of
law" because the procedure gave notice and an opportunity for
a hearing before final disposition of the property. The U. S.
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam5 on the basis of two prior
decisions.9
In the first, Ownbey v. Morgan,0 the Court held that a Delaware foreign attachment law which required a defendant to
post security before he could defend on the merits did not vio4. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2751: "The defendant in the executory proceeding
may arrest the seizure and sale of the property by injunction when the debt
secured by the mortgage or privilege is extinguished, or is legally unenforceable, or if the procedure required by law for an executory proceeding
has not been followed."
5. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2642: "Defenses and procedural objections to an
executory proceeding may be asserted either through an injunction proceeding to arrest the seizure and sale as provided in Article 2751 through 2754,
or a suspensive appeal from the order directing the issuance of the writ of
seizure and sale, or both.
"A suspensive appeal from an order directing the issuance of a writ of
seizure and sale shall be taken within fifteen days of the signing of the
order. The appeal is governed by the provisions of Article 2081 through
2086, 2088 through 2122, and 2124 through 2167, except that the security therefor shall be for an amount exceeding by one-half the balance due on the
debt secured by the mortgage or privilege sought to be enforced, including
principal, interest to date of the order of appeal, and attorney's fee, but
exclusive of court costs. As amended Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1."
6. LA. COD OF PRAcTicE arts. 732-753 (executory process); 239-268 (attachment); 269-283 (sequestration); 284-295.1 (provisional seizure).
7. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
8. 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
9. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), and Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
10. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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late the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court reasoned that the requirement of giving security in a proceeding begun by foreign attachment was well established and
widely used at the time the Constitution was adopted and thus
could not be deemed inconsistent with due process especially
because the condition bore a reasonable relation to the conversion of the proceeding from quasi in rem into an action in personam and, moreover, the defendant was held to know that if he
left the jurisdiction, his property would have to answer for the
demands against him.
In Coffin Brothers & -Co. v. Bennett,!' the Court rejected a
due process challenge to a Georgia statute which gave the Superintendent of Banks the power to issue an execution which operated as a lien on the property of shareholders of defunct banks
where the shareholders failed to pay an assessment. The Court
rejected the challenge because shareholders could provoke a trial
by executing an affidavit of illegality and therefore there would
be opportunity to be heard and to present defenses to the execution. The Court further concluded that the fact that the execution was issued by an agent of the state and not from a court was
not grounds for objection because the execution was followed by
personal notice and a right to take the case into court for a
hearing.
Thus the Supreme Court seemed to be saying that in cases
involving preliminary seizure of a debtor's property by a creditor
without a prior hearing there was no violation of due process
because the debtor had an opportunity to challenge the seizure
at a subsequent judicial hearing. This position found further support in the Supreme Court cases's upholding state action to eliminate nuisances which were threats to the welfare of its citizens
where property was taken and destroyed before the owner had
had a hearing. For example, in North American Cold Storage Co.
3
v. Chicago,"
the Chicago Health Department had seized food
alleging it was unfit for human consumption and the owner had
11. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
12. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
(misbranded drugs); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (contaminated food). C. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (protect against economic harm of a bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (collect internal revenue).
13. 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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argued that he was being deprived of property without due process of law. The Court rejected this, concluding that the state
could seize the contaminated food without a prior hearing
because of its duty to protect the health of its citizens and that
the rights of the owner were fully protected because he could
sue for a wrongful taking of his property and if the defendants
could not prove that the food was indeed unfit for human consumption, then the owner would be awarded damages.
In particular with respect to Louisiana's executory process
the Supreme Court had observed, 14 in dicta, that the proceeding
was analogous to well known common law proceedings whereby
execution might issue without previous notice to the debtor and
that such proceedings were never denied to be due process of
law. In addition, the Court noted that under the Louisiana provisions the sale of the debtor's property could not take place
until the debtor had had notice and an opportunity to interpose
objections.
This well-established assumption that creditors could seize
debtors' property without a prior hearing through attachment
and similar procedures without violating the requirements of due
process of law was shaken somewhat by the 1969 Supreme Court
case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,15 in which the creditor
had instituted a garnishment action under a Wisconsin statute
and had seized fifty percent of the defendant's wages. The argument that this seizure of wages without notice or an opportunity
to be heard violated the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment was rejected by the Wisconsin supreme
court.16 In so doing, the court reasoned that the garnishment
was not a final determination of the defendant's rights to the
property and that the defendant would receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard before permanently losing the property.
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Mclnnes, 17 0 wnbey 8
and Coffin 19 and, after noting that this type of remedy dated back
to Roman Law, quoted Mr. Justice Holmes, "If a thing has been
practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need
14. Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 538 (1892).
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
16. 37 Wis.2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1968).
17. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per cur4am, 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
18. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
19. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
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a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it ..... 2o
As a further basis for rejecting the defendant's claim of a denial
of due process the court pointed out that the defendant could
contest the plaintiff's right to use garnishment by a summary proceeding before trial 21 and also that a garnishment without probable cause could be the basis of a suit for malicious prosecution.
The Supreme Court reversed. 22 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, found that under the Wisconsin statute the
wages would remain frozen until trial without the defendant
having any opportunity to present any defense (no mention was
made of the summary proceeding to test whether there was a
good faith controversy, possibly because it would be of such limited utility in most cases) and whereas such a summary seizure
might be justified in extraordinary circumstances, this was not a
case requiring special protection for creditor or state interest
and, moreover, the statute was not narrowly drawn to meet such
unusual situations. The majority emphasized that this case dealt
with wages, a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems, and that a prejudgment garnishment might impose tremendous hardship on debtors ("a prejudgment garnishment of
the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wageearning family to the wall") 23 while, at the same time, such a
procedure would give the creditor tremendous leverage in negotiations with the debtor. The Court concluded that without notice
and a prior hearing the taking of property under the Wisconsin
garnishment procedure violated the fundamental principles of
due process.
In his concurring opinion,
"due process is afforded only by
which are aimed at establishing
able validity, of the underlying

Mr. Justice Harlan stated that
the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing'
the validity, or at least the probclaim against the alleged debtor

20. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922), quoted in Sniadach,
37 Wis.2d 163, 171-72, 154 N.W.2d 259, 264 (1968).

21. But the dissent argued that under Wisconsin law the defendant's
motion to dismiss is limited to determining whether a good faith controversy
exists and that all the plaintiff has to do is to file an affidavit of indebtedness and that this will defeat the defendant's motion to dismiss. 37 Wis.2d
163, 182; 154 N.W.2d 259, 270 (1968).
22. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

23. Id. at 340-41.

19721

FUENTES V. SHEVIN

before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted
24
use."
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Black argued that the majority
struck down the Wisconsin garnishment statute because it considered it to be a bad state policy and that by so doing it was
usurping the power of a state legislature to decide what laws
the state should have and, further, that this was not a sound
basis for striking down legal practices and customs which had
25
previously been upheld.
Because the majority in Sniadach had emphasized that the
case concerned wages-"a specialized type of property presenting
distinct problems in our economic system" 2 -and that wage
garnishment may impose tremendous hardship on the wage
earner, it was not clear whether the requirement of prior notice
and a hearing was to be applied only where seizures involved
other special kinds of property and there was the danger of tremendous hardship or whether Sniadach was to be applied broadly
to mean that due process required prior notice and a hearing
before a debtor can be deprived of the use of his property except
in special situations. The question was not answered by the next
two Supreme Court cases to deal with the due process requirement of notice and a hearing. In the first, Goldberg v. Kelly,2 7
the Court held that due process required notice and a prior hearing before the state could terminate welfare payments. In the
second, Bell v. Burson,28 the Court held that a prior hearing on
the question of possible liability was required before a state could
deprive an uninsured motorist of his license if he did not provide
security for claims arising out of the accident. These cases did
not clearly define the scope of Sniadach's applicability to prejudgment seizures by creditors because, first, both cases dealt
with actions by state agencies and so in each case government
interests were competing with the private interests of citizens in
the continued possession and use of their property whereas in
24. Ird. at 343.
25. The dissent cited McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928),
aff'd per curtam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928), and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(1921), among others.
26. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
27. 897 U.S. 254 (1969).
28. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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Sniadach the competing interests were private-those of creditor
and debtor; and secondly, in both cases, the property could be
considered special and necessary. Welfare payments are clearly
as important to the well-being of a family as are wages, maybe
even more so, and so should be given the same protection. And
although at first a driver's license may not seem entitled to
similar protection, when, as in Bell, it is necessary in order for
the driver to carry on his occupation then it too can be considered special property.
With the question not clearly resolved by the Supreme
Court, it was not surprising that federal and state courts divided
on the scope of the Sniadach rule. Some courts gave it a narrow
reading, for example, in Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v.
MacMillan,2 9 the court upheld the constitutionality of New Jersey's replevin statutes under which the plaintiff had repossessed
household furniture when the defendants had defaulted on their
payments. In arguing that their rights to due process had been
violated the defendants relied on Sniadach and Goldberg but the
court distinguished these cases as applicable to special situations
and not to the issues presented in this case. In refusing to strike
down the replevin statute, the court recognized that the replevin
procedure had not been questioned before in the state and had
become such an integral part of modern financing that it should
not be disturbed by a sudden declaration of unconstitutionality.
Moreover, the buyer was aware that "If you don't pay, they take
it away."''
The court concluded that a higher court should
review the constitutionality of the statute in the light of the
conflicting interests and the impact a declaration of unconstitutionality would have on existing credit transactions.
29. 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862 (1971). Also, American Oil Co. v.
McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 1970): "We do not think that Sniadach was intended to preclude all attachments and garnishments merely
because some hardship may result."
Also, e.g., Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1970); Brunswick
Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Black Watch Farms, Inc.
v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Craig v. Commonwealth, 471
S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1971); Yoder v. County of Cumberland, 278 A.2d
379 (Me. 1971); Reutzel v. Minnesota, 290 Minn. 88, 186 N.W.2d 521 (1971).
See also cases cited in Fuentes, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1990 n.5 (1972).
30. 116 N.J. Super. 65, 69, 280 A.2d 862, 864 (1971).

1972]

FUENTES V. SHEVIN

But other courts gave Sniadach a broader reading.81 After
Sniadach had declared Wisconsin's wage garnishment statute
unconstitutional, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied that decision to all garnishment actions because it could see no valid distinction between the garnishment of wages and that of other
property. 82 The court concluded the type of property involved
should not determine whether there had been a violation of due
process.
California courts also gave Sniadach a liberal interpretation,
applying it to strike down not only a wage garnishment statute3
but also other statutes which allowed a creditor to dispossess a
debtor without a prior hearing.3 4 In Blair v. Pitchess,85 the court,
in striking down California's claim and deliver statute, interpreted Sniadach to mean that any taking of property prior to a
hearing must be justified by strong state or creditor interests
and, applying that principle, concluded that the general risk that
the debtor might abscond with the property was not a sufficient
creditor interest to outweigh the possible hardship the seizure
of personal property might cause to the debtor. Although the
court did recognize that in some cases there might be such a
serious danger that a debtor might destroy or abscond with the
property that a seizure without a hearing might be justified, it
concluded that the California statute could not be upheld on that
basis because it was not narrowly drawn to cover only such
extraordinary situations.
Similarly, in Randone v. Appellate Dept.,

6

the California

31. E.g., United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971); Cinerama,
Inc. v. United States District Court for District of Hawaii, 436 F.2d 977 (9th
Cir. 1971); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335
(1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See a~so cases cited in Fuentes, 92 S.Ct.
1983, 1990 n.5 (1972).
32. Larson v. Featherston, 44 Wis.2d, 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). Other
states also declared their garnishment statutes invalid: Termplan, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); McCallop v. Carberry, 1
Cal.3d 903, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 (1970); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor
Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
33. McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal.3d 903, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122
(1970); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal.3d 908, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669, 464 P.2d 125
(1970).
34. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal.App.3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971); Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971); Randone v.
Appellate Dept., 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
35. 5 Cal.3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971).
36. 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
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court stated that Sniadach did not create a special constitutional
rule for wages but rather that it returned the whole area of prejudgment remedies to the due process principle that, except in
extraordinary circumstances, no person shall be deprived of
property without notice and a prior hearing.8 The court recognized that Sniadach was a departure from earlier cases which
had upheld summary prejudgment attachment and garnishment
but stated that this was a change in result-caused by a reevaluation of the potential and actual effect such seizures had
upon debtors-and not a change in the principles of due process.
The court further reasoned that, whereas prior courts had concluded that these seizures were not a "taking" of property
because they were only temporary, Sniadach had ruled that the
loss of the use of the property was indeed a "taking" which often
resulted in serious hardship. Based on these principles the court
struck down that California prejudgment attachment statute
which had sanctioned a deprivation of the debtor's use of his
property without notice or a hearing. In voiding the statute the
court rejected the contentions that this procedure was in the
general public interest by making credit more available and also
rejected as insufficient the general interest of creditors in having
security against the debtors concealing or destroying the property. The court recognized the possible validity of such a procedure in extraordinary circumstances but ruled that this could
not save the statute because it was not narrowly drawn to cover
just those situations.
With lower courts thus divided, the Supreme Court moved
to eliminate the uncertainty about the scope of its prior rulings
in Sniadach and Goldberg when, in the companion cases of
Fuentes v. Shevin and Parhan v. Cortese,38 it ruled that the
Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes were
inconsistent with the requirements of due process because they
allowed the seizure of a debtor's property without first giving
him notice and opportunity to be heard. Under the Florida statute a party could obtain a writ of replevin by filing a complaint
in an action for repossession and by posting bond. Once this was
done the writ would be issued by the clerk and the property
would be seized and, unless the defendant reclaimed it within
37. Id. at 715, 488 P.2d at 19.
38. 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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three days by posting bond, it would be transferred to the plaintiff. The defendant would have a hearing at the trial of the action
for repossession. The Pennsylvania statute was similar except
that the person seeking the writ need not file an action for repossession and thus if the party losing the property wanted a hearing he would have to initiate the suit himself. In each case&9 a
three judge federal court had upheld the constitutionality of the
statutes by finding that Sniadach and Goldberg required prior
notice and a hearing only when seizure of special types of property-wages and welfare payments-might result in serious hardship to the debtor and therefore were not applicable because in
the cases before them the creditors were repossessing personal
property-a stereo, stove and other household goods-to which
they held title under the conditional sales contracts and that the
seizures would not impose a hardship on the debtors comparable
to that which would result from a seizure of the necessities of
life, e.g., wages.
40
The Supreme Court reversed in a four to three decision.
The Court stated that the due process guarantee of notice and an
opportunity to be heard was to protect an individual from the
danger of an arbitrary, unfair, or mistaken deprivation of the
use or possession of his property and that therefore it must be
given at a time when the deprivation could still be prevented.
Whereas earlier cases 41 had found due process to be satisfied
because, even though there had been no prior hearing, nevertheless there was a hearing before a defendant's rights to the property were permanently cut off, the Court rejected this position
stating that no subsequent hearing or award of damages for
wrongful dispossession could undo the fact that the arbitrary
taking had already occurred. The Court also rejected the contention that the requirement of a bond was a sufficient substitute
for the prior hearing because, the Court stated, the bond merely
tests the plaintiff's belief in his position and this confidence may
be misplaced particularly when his self-interest is at stake. The
Court concluded that the only adequate safeguard is a prior
hearing at which a court would have a chance to hear both sides

39. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
40. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the decision.
41. E.g., Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928) aff'd per
curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
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before taking any action and that this principle had long been
recognized under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 42
In applying this basic principle to the cases before it, the
Court ruled that even though the debtors lacked full title to the
goods, their interest in the continued use and possession of the
goods was a significant property interest protected by the Due
Process Clause and, further, that even the temporary loss of the
use and possession of the goods was a deprivation within the
terms of the fourteenth amendment. The fact that the purchasers
had fallen behind in their payments and had no valid defense
was immaterial because the right to a hearing is not conditioned
on a showing of probable success at that hearing.
The district courts4 8 had limited Sniadach and Goldberg to
requiring prior hearing for necessary property such as wages and
welfare benefits but this, the Supreme Court stated, was because
of an incorrect premise that these decisions were a radical departure from established principles of procedural due process
whereas both cases were actually in the mainstream of prior
45
cases" and that this should have been made clear by the Bel
decision. The Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment
speaks of property generally and that if the principle of procedural due proces is to be applied objectively it cannot be based
on whether courts consider the property to be a necessity or not.
In stating the requirements of procedural due process, the
Court recognized that extraordinary situations might justify
42. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972) and cases cited therein at
1995. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786 (1971), where the court
stated, "t]hat the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver, and
is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual
be given an opportunity or [sic] a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest [citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)], except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that
justifies postponing the hearing until after the event." See Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
43. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
44. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1998 (1972), where the court in n.19
stated: "The Supreme Court of California recently put the matter accurately: 'Bniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional adjudication. It is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream
of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.' Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 718,
488 P.2d 13, 22."
45. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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postponing notice and an opportunity for a hearing but stated
that these must be truly unusual situations. 40 In the prior cases
where summary seizure had been allowed the Court found that
three important factors had been present: first, the seizure
secured an important governmental or general public interest;
second, there was need for very quick action; and, third, the
seizure was initiated by a government official who determined
the need for the seizure in the light of a narrowly drawn statute
(e.g., seizure of contaminated food by health officials) .47 The
Court found that the replevin statutes served no similarly important government or general public interest for they authorized
summary seizure when only private gain is at stake and concluded that reducing the costs involved in repossessing goods
would not be a sufficient reason to override the requirements of
due process. 48 Secondly, the statutes are not limited to special
situations requiring prompt action and here the Court recognized
that a creditor might justify summary seizure by a showing of
immediate danger that the debtor might conceal or destroy the
property. And, on the last point, the Court found no strong state
control but instead an abdication of such control because no state
official participated in the decision to seek the writ, or reviewed
the basis for the claim to repossession, or evaluated the need for
immediate seizure.
In its conclusion, the Court held the statutes to be a deprivation of property without due process of law because they deny
the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before property is
seized. But in so holding the Court recognized that a state has
the power to seize goods before a final judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors provided the creditors have
tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior
hearing. The form such a hearing may take is for the legislature
to determine but since the purpose of the hearing is to prevent
46. As recognized exceptions to the right of a prior hearing, the Court
cited Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) and Ownbey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921). With respect to Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A.
699, aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928), the Court stated, "As far as essential procedural due process doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand for any more
than was established in the Coffin Brothers and Ownbey cases on which it
relied completely." Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999, n.23 (1972).
47. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). Other
examples are cited In Fuentes, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2000 nn. 24-27 (1972).
48. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999 n.22, 2000 n.29 (1972).
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unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, it is essential that
the hearing provide a real test of the validity of the underlying
claim against the debtor before he can be deprived of his prop49
erty.
The dissent 5° in Fuentes took the position that the replevin
statute properly balanced the antagonistic interests of the buyer
and seller by providing that the buyer would lose use of the property temporarily but would be protected by the bond and that
the seller would be protected against deterioration of the property pending final adjudication but would have to furnish security for the buyer and concluded that whether this violated the
Constitution depended upon how the practical considerations
were viewed. From the point of view of the majority a hearing
was necessary to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivation of
property, but, as the dissent saw it, if the debtor had in fact
defaulted, then it was not only fair but essential that the creditor
be allowed to repossess and that dollar and cents considerations
would protect the debtor from false claims of default because it
is in the creditor-seller's interests that the transaction be completed rather than end in repossession and further because a
creditor would not lightly undertake the expense of instituting a
replevin action and posting a bond. The dissent distinguished the
prior cases of Goldberg and Bell by stating that they provided
no automatic test for determining when due process required
adversary hearings because what is required depends upon a
determination of the private interest that may be affected in
each case. The dissent reasoned that in these cases due process
would not require that creditors do more than they already had
because the creditor has a substantial interest in preventing further use and deterioration of the property to which he retained
title (an interest the dissent stated had been ignored by the
majority) and that this interest is as deserving of protection as
that of the debtor. In its conclusion the dissent expressed doubt
that the requirements established by the majority would result
in greater protection for the debtor than the present laws pro49. Id. at 2002. The Court cited Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969).
50. The dissent was written by Mr. Justice White who was joined in his
dissent by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun,
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vided 51 and that, in effect, the only result of the decision would
be to make credit less available or, at least, more expensive.
These decisions, particularly Fuentes, raise serious doubt as
to the validity of Louisiana's prejudgment remedies of sequestration and attachment and also executory process for each of
these remedies allows a party to be dispossessed of property
without a prior notice or opportunity to be heard. 52 Considering
each remedy specifically, it seems that the use of the writ of
sequestration would be a denial of due process because, as
expresed above, there is no prior notice or a hearing and a plaintiff who claims the ownership or right to possession or a security
interest (lien, privilege or mortgage) in the property may have
it summarily seized if it is simply within the power of the defendant to waste, conceal or dispose of the property. 53 This is too
broadly drawn to be a justified exception to the requirements of
due process for only truly unusual and extraordinary situations
would justify postponing notice and an opportunity for a hear54
ing.
The Code of Civil Procedure allows a writ of attachment to
be issued and the property to be seized without prior notice or
hearing in several situations.5 5 Specifically, one of the grounds
for the writ is the fact that the defendant is a nonresident and
attachment secures quasi in rem jurisdiction over him. 56 The use
of the writ in this situation should still be valid because an
earlier Supreme Court case, Ownbey v. Morgan,57 had upheld the
51. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2005 (1972): "It would appear that creditors could withstand attack under today's opinion simply by making clear in the controlling
credit instruments that they may retake possession without a hearing, or,
for that matter, without resort to judicial process at all. Alternatively, they
need only give a few days' notice of a hearing, take possession if hearing is
waived or if there Is default; and if hearing is necessary merely establish

probable cause for asserting that default has occurred."
52. See notes 1 and 3 supra.

53. LA. CODE Cv. P. art. 3571.
54. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999 (1972): "There are 'extraordinary situations' that
justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. Boddie v. Connecti-

cut, supra, 401 U.S. at 379, 91 S.Ct. at 786. These situations, however, must
be truly unusual."

Id.

at 2000:

"There may be cases in which a creditor

could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or
conceal disputed goods. But the statutes before us are not 'narrowly drawn

to meet any such unusual condition.'

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,

supra, 395 U.S. at 339, 89 S. Ct. at 1821.
presented by the facts of these cases."

55. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3541.
56. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 9.
57. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).

And no such unusual situation is
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validity of such a seizure and Fuentes recognized this as a justified exception because securing jurisdiction was considered a
most basic and important public interest."5 The writ can also be
issued when a defendant has concealed himself to avoid service
of citation, and this may also be justified because of the same
important public interest, that is, enabling a court to secure jurisdiction.5 9 Another basis for obtaining the writ is that the defendant has or is about to leave the state permanently before a
judgment can be obtained and executed against him. If strong
public interest justifies summary attachment where the defendant is already a nonresident then it should also justify summary
attachment when the defendant has left the state permanently
or is about to do so because in both cases the attachment enables
a court to render a judgment and execute it against the property
attached. The other two grounds for attachment are intended to
protect creditors when the debtor has, or is about to, mortgage,
assign or dispose of his property with the intent to defraud his
creditors or to give one of them an unfair preference or when
the debtor has converted or is about to convert his property into
money or evidence of debt with the intent to place it beyond the
reach of his creditors. Fuentes recognized that postponing notice
and a hearing would be justified where a creditor could show
immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal property
but the statute must be limited to such special situations 0 and
it is submitted that the provisions above should fit within that
test because they are narrowly drawn-the attachment will only
issue when the debtor has acted or is about to act (unlike sequestration which only requires that the defendant have the
power to conceal or dispose of the property). More importantly,
these provisions are necessary if the creditor's interests are to
be protected at all because if the creditor's fears are well founded,
then only summary seizure will protect him and if he is wrong,
then the award of damages0 1 should adequately protect the
debtor for the temporary loss of the property. Also, the creditor
has the difficult burden of proving intent to defraud on the part
58. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999 n.23 (1972): "Another case involved attachment
necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly a most basic and
Important public interest. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S. Ct. 433, 65
L. Ed. 837."
59. Id.
60. See note 54 supra.
61. See note 2 supra.
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of the defendant in order to justify the attachment and this
should be a strong deterrent to the abuse of this remedy because
he is unlikely to undertake this burden, with the attendant risk
of damages, unless he is convinced he can succeed.
Executory process presents special problems. Unlike the
writs of attachment and sequestration which are issued upon
the verified petition of the creditor and upon the posting of a
bond, the writ of seizure and sale is issued only if the creditor
presents authentic evidence of the obligation and of the act 8of2
mortgage or privilege containing the confession of judgment.
This raises the question whether the requirement of authentic
evidence would be a sufficient equivalent to notice and a hearing
to satisfy due process. That it would not seems clear from the
statements by the majority in Fuentes8 (and by the concurring
opinion in Sniadach)14 that arbitrary and unfair deprivations of
property can be prevented only by a hearing which is a real test
of the validity or probable validity of claim against the debtor
and to be a real test it must be a hearing in which the debtor
has an opportunity to present his side. "For when a person has
an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the
State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and
simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented." 65 Moreover, the crucial fact of default which entitles
the creditor to use this summary procedure is simply shown by
86
allegations in the verified petition or by the creditor's affidavit
and this would be no more of a test of the probable validity of
the claim that the ex parte application for a writ of replevin
found constitutionally defective in Fuentes and where the Court
stated that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided
determination of facts decisive of rights ...

[and n]o better in-

strument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it." 67
62. LA. CODID CIv. P. art. 2635.
63. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994-96, 2002 (1972).
64. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969).
65. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972).
66. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2637.
67. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972), where the court quoted from Joint AntiFacist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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The Code further provides that the writ shall not issue until
after the debtor has been served with a demand for payment
within three days after service.6 The demand may be waived 0 9
(and almost always is) and therefore in almost all cases the writ
issues immediately and without prior notice to the debtor. But
would Louisiana's executory process be in accord with the constitutional requirements of due process if a creditor did not take
advantage of the waiver and had the demand for payment served
on the defendant? The debtor could then file a petition to enjoin
the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale 0 (in many cases without posting bond) 7 1 and at the hearing on the petition for injunction the court would determine the creditor's right to use
executory process. There would thus be notice and a hearing
before seizure and this would seem to satisfy due process. But
there are difficulties with this position. First, the notice simply
demands that the debtor pay the debt,72 it does not notify him
of his opportunity to have a hearing either through the petition
for an injunction or by taking a suspensive appeal.73 Moreover,
the demand only allows the debtor three days and therefore it
is doubtful that this would meet the requirement of giving notice
and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. There is also a more fundamental difficulty
in that this position shifts the burden to the debtor to call the
hearing. It is submitted that when the Court in Fuentes spoke
of the due process requirements of notice and an opportunity
to be heard it did not mean simply notifying the debtor that he
could provoke a hearing if he wanted one, but rather that there
must be a hearing on the creditor's right to seize the property
and the debtor must be timely notified so that he can appear to
challenge if he wishes.J4 If he does not, the hearing will be onesided but the debtor will, at least, have had his opportunity to
be heard.
An important question to be answered is whether a debtor
could waive his right to notice and a prior hearing. This argu68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
(1972).

LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2639.
Id.
Bee note 4 supra.
LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 2753.
See note 68 supra.
See note 5 supra.
See notes 51, 63 supra and 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999, nn. 21-22, 2000 n.29
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ment was advanced in Fuentes based on language in the conditional sales contracts which provided that, upon default, the
creditor could retake or repossess the goods sold. The Court rejected the argument by stating that any waiver must be clearly
expressed and that in these contracts there was no mention of
a waiver of a prior hearing, only a statement of the creditor's
right to retake the goods without indicating how this could be
done. But even if a contract contained a clear statement that
the debtor waived his right to notice and a prior hearing, there
would be other problems. In an earlier case, Overmeyer v.
Frick,75 the Court upheld the waiver of notice and a prior hearing because, under the facts in that case, the waiver was found to
have been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. In
Overmeyer the waiver had been specifically bargained for in
negotiations between two corporations conducted by their respective attorneys, was not part of an adhesion contract and was
not the product of unequal bargaining power. The facts in
Fuentes were quite different as the Court noted: there was no
bargaining over the waiver; the parties were far from equal in
bargaining power; the waiver was in a printed form sales contract, and there was no showing that the buyers were made
aware that the fine print contained a waiver of constitutional
rights. Although, as noted earlier, the Court rejected the waiver
simply because the language was not a clear waiver of any rights,
the enumeration of these factors is significant in trying to answer
the question of how a waiver could be intelligently and knowingly made. A contract could contain very clear language to the
effect that the debtor is waiving his right to notice and a hearing
before property is seized and he could be required to initial that
language to indicate that he was made aware of it but there
would still be the problem of equal bargaining power. In Overmeyer the waiver was given after the debtor was in default in
his payments on a construction contract and in return for the
creditor's agreeing to release specific liens on the propertyclearly an intelligent, voluntary waiver-but could the same be
said for the waiver given by the debtor at the time the contract
is executed, where consideration for the waiver would be the
willingness of the creditor to advance credit? If such a waiver
were to be upheld then it would be part of every credit trans75. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
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action and property would almost always be seized summarily
without notice or a hearing just as it had been before Sniadach
and Fuentes. It was this possibility which led the dissent in
Fuentes to conclude that in the end the decision will have little
impact.76 On the other hand, if the Court were to strike down
a waiver because the debtor could not really bargain with respect to it since every creditor would insist on the waiver, then
the result would probably be more expensive credit or even the
denial of credit in certain cases but, as one court noted, maybe
more restrictive credit practices might be in the general public
interest."7
If the assumption that the due process requirements of notice
and a prior hearing are applicable to Louisiana's writ of sequestration and executory process is correct, then the solution would
have to be amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure which
would provide, for example, that after the plaintiff files a petition in executory process or for a writ of sequestration, then a
date for hearing78 would be set and the defendant would be
served with notice that any objections he may have should be
presented at that hearing. But before these amendments are enacted, creditors would be well advised to use attachment rather
than sequestration and an ordinary proceeding rather than executory process especially since, after Fuentes, a sale of immovable
property under a writ of seizure and sale carries with it the risk
79
of a serious defect in the title.

76. See note 51 supra.
77. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal.3d 536, 555, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722, 488
P.2d 13, 26 (1971).
78. In order to give adequate notice and time to prepare, the hearing
should be set at least ten days from date of service of notice.
79. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that Fuentes would be
applied retroactively and, since title security is involved, it is unlikely that
it would be so applied. But there is still the problem of titles based on sales
through executory process after Fuentes was decided (June 12, 1972). If it
were held to apply to all those sales then it is possible that the defendant
in executory process might be able to recover the property. Cf. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), where plaintiff sued purchaser at judicial sale and
recovered his property because the court which had rendered the judgment
under which the property had been sold lacked jurisdiction and therefore
plaintiff's rights to procedural due process had been violated.

